Iran

CAATSA Implementation Makes US Strategy in Afghanistan Even More Unsustainable

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The next chapter in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) saga will unfold on November 5, 2018. On this day, the provisions reimposing sanctions on entities trading with Iran in certain sectors will come into effect.

In India, the primary discussion point has been whether India will receive a significant reduction exemption on November 5. Such an exemption will allow Indian companies to continue importing Iranian oil without coming under ‘menu-based’ sanctions. It is quite likely that India might receive an exemption for both oil imports and for development of the Chabahar port. However that is not the only point of contention for India and the region.

Regardless of the decision on November 5, CAATSA is already closing the door on new solutions for the war in Afghanistan.

First, it increases the costs for Iran and India to collaborate on Afghanistan. We had written last year that not only will the Chabahar port help Afghanistan, the US will have much to gain from a connectivity project for Central Asia which does not have China at its core. But with the threat of secondary sanctions looming, companies at the margin will not invest in any project that involves Iran — why assume the risk of a volatile geopolitical environment which comes at a prospective cost of making business in the US market difficult?

Second, it also closes the door on a Russia – US understanding in Afghanistan. What we often forget is that ouster of the Taliban after 9/11 was made easier by an alignment of interests between US and Russia albeit for a brief period of time. Russia at that time provided critical logistical support from Afghanistan’s north and shared crucial intelligence for US-led coalition forces. CAATSA makes any such arrangement in the future even more unlikely.

Combine these two effects with the fact that the US attempt at talks with the Taliban are making no headways, and what you get is that there are zero new possibilities to end the war in Afghanistan. Only two scenarios remain. One involves the US withdrawing out of Afghanistan completely. The second involves the US returning to its dependence on Pakistan. Both scenarios will leave Afghanistan worse-off.

 

 

Why has the US Policy Orthodoxy on Iran Sustained for Four Decades?

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On 8th May, the US President announced that the US was withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. The US would also be reimposing the sanctions on Iran that were in place prior to the deal. Essentially, we are back to a hostile Iran-US relationship after a short break where a change seemed likely. Now, this hostile policy orthodoxy in the US vis-a-vis Iran has sustained itself for nearly 4 decades. And one of the foreign policy mysteries for me has been: why is that the case?

After all, Iran is one of the most “normal” states in West Asia. It is also a regional power and now there is even some alignment between US and Iranian interests in Afghanistan and over ISIS. And yet, the foreign policy of the US towards Iran hasn’t change for nearly forty years. What are the possible reasons? I asked this question to my colleagues. I’m summarising some of their responses and my own views on them.

The oft-repeated reason given is the Iran hostage crisis of 1979. It is argued that this highly televised, 444-day imbroglio is the reason behind the perception of Iran as a ‘rogue state’ in the US. I doubt if that is the case. Even though this crisis might well be the reason that set the current policy orthodoxy in motion, it does not sufficiently explain why the orthodoxy would continue for four decades. In fact, in the same year the US embassy in Islamabad was burnt. Two Americans died as a result. And yet, there was no break in the US-Pakistan relationship. So, it doesn’t seem logical that another contemporary incident of a similar nature, one in which no American hostage was killed, can create and sustain a policy orthodoxy for four decades. 

The second reason given is that the hatred towards Iran is sustained by Iran’s own acts of hostility towards the US. Indeed, Iran has often taken up the gauntlet on various occasions. But again, this reason doesn’t sufficiently explain why the policy orthodoxy did not change even after Iran demonstrated its willingness to change as part of the P5+1 negotiations. The North Korean example shows that the US that a change in relationship terms is possible even with a state belonging to the ‘axis of evil’.

The third reason given is Trump. That’s an easy one to contest though. Long before Trump came into the picture, this policy orthodoxy was still going strong.

The fourth reason give is “follow the money”. The argument is that pro-Israel and pro-Saudi lobbies in the US ensure that there is no foreign policy change in the US on the Iran issue. There is some weight in this argument and it could help explain the longevity of the policy orthodoxy. If that is case, the emergent hypothesis is that the policy change is incumbent on the Iran-Saudi Arabia-Israel triangle. Unless Iran can patch up with at least one of these two West Asian powers, the US will keep the heat on. 

In any case, this question needs methodical research. I think it’s just one of those questions in foreign policy which is not raised enough. Someone should do a study of the kind Nicolas Blarel has done to explain the orthodoxy and change in the India-Israel relationship. Or perhaps, I have been ignorant. If you know of a study that tackles this question systematically, please point me to it!

 

 

The latest advertisement for nuclear weapons

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Here’s what has happened in the past few months.

North Korea demonstrated that it has nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to the United States. After it did that, the president of the United States set aside age-old policy and decided to meet the North Korean leader, ahead of possible lifting of sanctions against that country.

Iran froze — or perhaps slowed down — its nuclear weapons programme because it signed a deal with the United States and Europe in 2015. After it did that, the president of the United States reneged on the deal, advised Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, and is coercing the international community to re-impose sanctions.

The message is simple and inescapable. Possessing a nuclear arsenal is necessary if you wish to resist being bullied by the world’s great powers. Donald Trump’s actions are an advertisement for nuclear weapons.

He’s not the first US president to do show countries around the world the value of possessing nuclear weapons. Previous US presidents invaded Iraq (that didn’t have a nuclear bomb) ostensibly to punish Saddam Hussein for sheltering al Qaeda terrorists, while bankrolling Pakistan, that was sheltering al Qaeda terrorists, but also had a nuclear arsenal. Under another US president, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi who had given up his nuclear programme, came to a sticky end.

Therein lies the root cause of the failure of nuclear non-proliferation. It invests too much energy in technical compliance and technology controls, even as the NPT-sanctified nuclear weapons states create powerful, perhaps existential incentives for the possession of a nuclear arsenal.

It’s now almost certain — even more than before — that the Iranians will develop a nuclear arsenal. That’ll cause the Saudis to bring their arsenal out of the closet. That in turn might cause Erdogan’s Turkey to want one too.

It will be tremendously foolish to continue to flog the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as a meaningful way to reduce nuclear risks. A more promising way forward for this century would be to attempt a Global No-First Use (GNFU) framework aimed to reduce risks than limit ownership.