China

Australia and the Logic of Strategy

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Edward Luttwak wrote presciently in 2012 that:

Other things being equal, when a state of China’s magnitude pursues rapid military growth, unless the resulting shift in the power balance passes the culminating point of resistance inducing the acceptance of some form of subjection, it causes a general realignment of forces against it, as former allies retreat into a watchful neutrality, former neutrals become adversaries, and adversaries old and new coalesce in formal or informal alliances against the excessively risen power.

Perhaps, this logic of strategy is most apparent in Australia’s recent foreign policy conduct. The setting up of a highly classified inquiry on Beijing’s clandestine influence over Australian politics by PM Malcom Turnbull in 2016 was the first sign that Australia is realigning its forces against China. This eventually resulted in a legislation in June 2018 that raises the costs for Australians found to be guilty of batting for foreign powers.

The second visible sign was Australia’s changed perception over the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Under Kevin Rudd’s leadership, Australia had withdrawn from discussions in 2008. In 2017, they were strongly back.

Signs three and four are specific to Australia’s engagement with India. Over the past couple of years, Australian federal and state governments have infused new vigour in their India connections. This multi-pronged approach has meant that Australia has even managed to create favourable stakeholders outside the Old New Delhi region. The frequency of visits by Australian state government legislators and policy experts to other cities in India has certainly increased. For example, Bengaluru alone is home to trade offices of Victoria and Queensland. New South Wales and Western Australia have trade offices in Mumbai. And the federal government’s Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade) has its presence in 10 Indian cities.

The fourth and the latest sign is an India Economic Strategy 2035 document that was released by the Australian government earlier this month. Commissioned by the Turnbull government, the document identifies 90 specific recommendations for increasing Australian presence in India. Not only does it identify the priority sectors, it also identifies the ten states in India that Australian federal and state governments must focus on. The document illustrates both:  foresight of the Australian foreign policy establishment and Luttwak’s logic of strategy.

 

Xi Jinping’s foreign policy pivot

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Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs recently, with his speech offering important insights into Chinese foreign policy philosophy, objectives and approaches. Xi defined his philosophical program as “diplomacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era,” outlining 10 key aspects of this thought.

Examining these, it isn’t surprising that Xi’s first and foremost priority in foreign affairs is to uphold the “authority of the CPC Central Committee” and strengthen “its centralised, unified leadership on external work.” This has a domestic and international component. Domestically, it refers to the emergence and role of a diverse set of actors in Chinese foreign affairs – from the top leadership, diplomatic corps, representatives at international institutions, party members in the judiciary, the trade and commerce bureaucracy, local governments, the military to financial institutions and state-owned enterprises. Externally, it implies an expansion in the role of party organs and ensuring that events outside do not jeopardise the Communist Party’s rule.

Analysing the state media readout of the speech, one can identify that the fundamental objective of Xi’s foreign policy is to “facilitate a favourable external environment for realising the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.” This is an expression of Xi’s shift from Deng Xiaoping’s tao guang yang hui (roughly translated to hide your strengths and bide your time) in favour of the strategy of fen fa you wei (roughly translated to striving for achievement.)

What this implies is that one can expect China to continue with an assertive foreign policy to actively shape events, attitudes and institutions in order to achieve its objectives. However, this round of assertion will be different from the nationalistic kind that has been witnessed since 2008, say in the South China Sea or with regard to Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute since 2012.

For starters, Xi acknowledges that China’s rise is “intertwined” and interacts with “the most profound and unprecedented changes (that the world is currently undergoing) in a century.” In such an environment, he is placing priority on developing “global partnerships while advancing diplomatic agenda.” This ranks two spaces above “national core interests as the bottom line” in the list of ten aspects of the new diplomatic thought. Also, ranking higher than core interests are the goals of “building of a community with a shared future for humanity” and “reform of the global governance system with the concept of fairness and justice.”

This indicates that Beijing is keen to actively “advance major country diplomacy” to reduce friction and work with partners, particularly developing countries, to expand its global influence and play a greater role in norm setting. For potential partners, this signifies an important window of opportunity, as China is likely be more amenable to addressing sources of tensions and flexible towards accommodating their concerns. One can view events like December’s South-South Human Rights Forum, Beijing’s outreach to New Delhi and Tokyo over the past few months, its deepening ties with Moscow, its attempts at negotiating a new South China Sea Code of Conduct with ASEAN and its efforts to gather support against Donald Trump’s protectionist policies in this context. This subtle change does not imply an infusion of universalistic or idealistic notions in Chinese foreign policy but is rather driven by pragmatism.

A final noteworthy aspect of Xi’s speech was the constant reference to history. The repeated emphasis on having “an accurate understanding of history,” the need to “review the past, summarise historical laws,” understand “the trend of history” and the identification of present times as a particularly significant “historical juncture” operate at multiple levels. First, it signifies a sense of manifest destiny that has characterised Xi’s leadership. Second, it is an example of personal narrative building, whereby Xi has appropriated for himself the goal of making China strong, after it has stood up and grown rich. This once again places Xi in the league of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, above his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. And third, it is a nudge to the party rank and file to maintain “strategic confidence” and not be disoriented by “ever-changing international chaos.”

Effectively what Xi appears to be telling Party cadres and the world at large is that while the tide of realpolitik may ebb and flow, China is here to play the long game, “keeping in mind both internal and international imperatives.”

Advantage China after Trump-Kim summit

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For all the talk about China being insecure with regard to potential Donald Trump-Kim Jong Un bonhomie, Beijing is likely to be rather pleased with the events that transpired in Singapore today.

First, soon after the early reports of the agreement came from Singapore, China called for easing sanctions and “establishing a peace mechanism.” The US-DPRK statement also envisions something similar, i.e., the “building of a lasting and robust peace regime.”

Such a framework places Beijing directly at the negotiating table. Foreign Minister Wang Yi underscored this today, saying China had and continues to play a “unique and important role” in the Korean Peninsula issue. The fact that Kim flew on an Air China jet shows Beijing’s continuing influence over Pyongyang.

Second, the formulation of the DPRK committing to work towards complete denuclearisation, while Trump describes US-South Korea drills as “provocative” and talks about ending US force presence in South Korea also works for Beijing in more ways than one. This is essentially what Beijing had been seeking for months, via its double freeze proposal. Moreover, Trump’s characterisation of US force presence in the region isn’t likely to have gone unnoticed in other regional capitals.

For one, the South Korean administration appeared to have been caught off guard with Trump offering the drills as a bargaining chip. The presidency and military both issued statements saying that clarity was needed on “the meaning and intention” of Trump’s remarks.

But more broadly, if US-South Korea military ties and exercises are “provocative,” would Washington under Trump be a reliable partner for states involved in the South China Sea dispute or even Taiwan, irrespective of the Indo-Pacific strategy and Defence Secretary James Mattis’ tough words at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Also, Trump’s remarks about the cost of military exercises are very damaging. It’s one thing to want allies to carry their weight. But the repeated counting of costs is incredibly short-sighted and likely to raise questions about the costs that the US will be willing to incur to challenge an assertive China in the region.

After today, it appears that for all the rhetoric, Trump is uninterested in incurring those costs. Trump might have sought history in Singapore. But today’s developments mean it’s advantage Beijing.

No Sympathy for Exam Stress

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As Indian high schoolers received board examination marks last week, their Chinese counterparts are appearing for their annual gaokao exams this week. The gaokao system, like the Indian board exams, receives a lot of flak for its many flaws. The gaokao examination in China usually determines where these students can pursue their college-level education. However, the main problem is that colleges require high gaokao scores for students who do not originate from that province. This is linked to the hukou system or the household registration scheme (almost an internal passport) which determines where you can work depending on your parent’s origin. As this Atlantic Times article puts it,

China’s prestigious Peking University and Tsinghua University, both based in Beijing, will collectively take about 84 students out of every 10,000 Beijingers who took the gaokao this June; 14 students from every 10,000 who took the gaokao in nearby Tianjin, 10 out of every 10,000 test-takers from Shanghai, and only about three per 10,000 candidates from Anhui,  and a mere two from every 10,000 taking the test in Guangdong.

This has led to a wave of ‘gaokao migrants’- people who move to other provinces or purchase land there so that their children will be able to take the exam in a province that has better universities. So authorities in provinces are now cracking down on those who are hoping to circumvent this system. According to this article in Sixth Tone, the province of Fujian, which has been seeing an increase in such gaokao migration, has cracked down on it:

To stem gaokao migration, Fujian education and police departments issued a joint notice on Monday clarifying the policies for students from elsewhere: Students must have had Fujian household registration for at least one year, and studied at a high school in the province for at least one year, before they qualify to take the exam in Fujian. In addition, their parents must have residency, stable employment, and records of social security payments in the province for at least one year.

Going forward, regulations will become even stricter: For students sitting the gaokao in 2019, the requirements will increase to two years, and three years for those taking the exams in 2020.

What this will mean is that migrants and people from low-income household will lose out either way. This is particularly disheartening, for a system that prides itself on its being a meritocracy.

The Indefatigable Chinese

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The US, worried about its increasing trade deficit with China, the decreasing number of jobs created at home, and the ailing steel sector in the US, decided to import a tariff of 25% tariff on all steel imports. It also decided to levy a special 200% import duty on import of Chinese steel and justified it by using the dumping argument.

Briefly, according to the WTO rules, a country cannot impose selective tariffs on goods based on geographical origin. Thus, in case a country is worried about increasing amount of steel being imported from China, it cannot selective put tariffs on only Chinese steel. Thus, the US imposed a tariff on all steel imports, which left many of its trading partners livid. It then made a few exceptions to Canada and Mexico, only to withdraw those later. However, there is one clause in the WTO, which allows you to target a country for tariffs – by showing that the country is involved in a process called dumping. Dumping is a case of price discrimination, where the producer is charging a different price to different customers. This is generally believed to be anti-competitive.

In China’s case, the allegation of dumping is based on the differential pricing of Chinese steel for consumers in China and the rest of the world. Since most Chinese steel companies are state funded, they charge a higher price at home and subsidises the export of steel, in order to conquer the other markets. China denies this, of course.

What is really interesting here though is that the Chinese have found a way to circumvent the additional dumping duties imposed by the US. China state-owned steel manufacturers are buying steel plants in other countries and then, shipping to the US, as reported in this WSJ article.

By owning production abroad, Chinese steelmakers aim to gain largely unfettered access to global markets. Their factories back in China are constrained by steep tariffs imposed by the U.S. and numerous other countries—largely before President Donald Trump took office—to stop Chinese steelmakers from dumping excess production onto world markets. But their factories outside China face few so-called antidumping tariffs.

“China is just moving whole industrial clusters to external geographies and then continuing to overproduce steel, aluminum, cement, plate glass, textiles, etc.,” says Tristan Kenderdine, research director at Future Risk, a consulting firm that tracks China’s overseas investments.

Hesteel, a Chinese state-owned manufacturer, purchased a dying steel mill in Serbia, invested millions of dollars, ramped up production and has started exporting to the US. Not only that, it also gets to circumvent the high tariff on steel by the EU. By producing within the EU common market area, it can export to the rest of the European Union, without any tariffs or customs. Similarly, China is already investing in steel plants in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, and many other emerging economies.

What China has managed to do is put US in a very peculiar position. If it wants to stop import of Chinese steel, it would now have to impose higher duties on a whole host of countries. If it does this, it will face severe backlash from these countries, which would end up severely hurting the US.

The cleverest move perhaps is that China has now forged a joint venture with Pittsburgh-based stainless-steel producer Allegheny Technologies Inc. The joint venture is restarting a stainless-steel rolling plant in western Pennsylvania and is importing 300,000 metric tons of semifinished stainless-steel slabs from an Indonesian plant owned by Chinese state-owned companies. This puts the US in a real pickle.

 

What is China’s perspective on the rules-based order?

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The concept of a rules-based order has become part of common diplomatic parlance of late. This framework roughly refers to a common set of rules or norms of engagement in the international arena that have been mutually agreed upon among states.

The recent debate around a rules-based order, in large part, is a product of changes taking place in the world order, owing to America’s relative decline and China’s rise. For instance, the idea of the importance of preserving the rules-based order is repeatedly invoked in connection with China’s island-building in the South China Sea and its rejection of the 2016 Hague tribunal’s verdict following a case by the Philippines. In this perspective, Beijing is seen as undermining the rules-based order.

At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, US Defence Secretary James Mattis and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi both referred to the importance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. A South China Morning Post round-up of the event quotes Yao Yunzhu, a retired PLA major general and a delegate at the SLD, as saying: “The US has created a grand narrative consisting of keywords including ‘rule-based order’, ‘freedom of navigation and overflight’, and ‘militarisation’ – once you hear these words, you know it’s a criticism targeting China.”

So what exactly is Beijing’s position on such a framework? Do Chinese policies disregard the rules of the road internationally or is there is a specific Chinese conceptualisation of a rules-based order?

The answer to these questions lies in the Chinese elite’s perception of their country’s international role based on an assessment of power. For instance, Xi Jinping’s articulation of “major power” or “big country” diplomacy implies that China does believe in different rules for different players. Intuitively, such a framework undermines the idea of a common framework for all states irrespective of size or power. It implies a difference in the rights and responsibilities of big and small countries.

That, nevertheless, does not imply an outright rejection of international institutions or norms. For instance, building a multilateral and multipolar world order remains a key Chinese objective. In such a framework, Beijing views institutions such as the UN and WTO as critical players. Its actions, for now, do not indicate a desire to upend the system. Rather, they reflect a wish to expand China’s authority within the system. Beijing, in fact, views the US, particularly under Donald Trump, as undermining this order with its America First policy.

Also, Chinese diplomacy has historically and ideologically been wedded to the primacy of the institution of sovereignty and thereby non-interference as the defining principle of the international order. Beijing’s repeated criticism of the West, particularly America, in terms of the doctrines of humanitarian intervention (Libya) and pre-emptive strike (Iraq) are rooted in this framework. This was also one of Beijing’s arguments against the Hague tribunal.

Sovereignty also forms the fundamental premise for Xi’s vision for building a community with shared future with mankind. For instance, on issues of economic development, human rights, political systems and so on, Beijing rejects the applicability of universal notions. Instead, it argues in favour of taking into consideration national conditions.

So, China is clearly articulating a vision for a rules-based order, albeit one premised on realpolitik and sovereignty.

India Needs an Aggressive China Insurance Policy

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What should India’s conduct with China look like? This question is on the minds of a lot of people in India’s foreign policy circles. I currently have a two-part answer to this question:

Part 1: Assuming that yogakshema for all Indians is defined as the national interest, India’s asks from China would be: peace on the borders and investments in the Indian economy. From a Chinese perspective, these asks are extremely beneficial too. Peace on the Indian border allows them to concentrate their efforts towards challenging the US in the South China Sea. And India is perhaps the only market with the scale and the stability to promise returns on Chinese capital currently flowing to weaker economies.

Part 2: Part 1 is insufficient because China’s recent movements – in Maldives, Nepal, and Doklam – are indicative of its tendency to eschew a mutually beneficial path and pick an openly hostile front instead. To prevent this switch, India needs to invest in I call an Aggressive China Insurance Policy. The motive of this policy is simple: should Xi Jinping’s China get aggressive with India, India should have readily available capacity to inflict significant pain to China in return. The insurance “premium” for this policy includes a variety of measures:

  1. Establish contacts with the key members of World Uyghur Congress and other such organisations.
  2. Shift the focus of “Act East/Look East” to one country — Vietnam.
  3. Offer Trump deals that can deepen the US-India engagement.
  4. Sponsor studies that puncture the “Chinese Leaders Do No Wrong” narrative.

This two-part policy can help India modulate its relationship with China.

How did China fare at the Shangri-La Dialogue?

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In many ways, the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in Singapore over the weekend played pretty much as per the script. Going into the event, the Chinese side was acutely aware that it would come in for criticism, with US Defence Secretary James Mattis likely to lead the charge. Before arriving in Singapore, Mattis had already warned of increased US action in the South China Sea.

Beijing, therefore, sought to define the event an “academic exchange” as opposed to a policy-level dialogue. That didn’t, however, dampen the combative tone of the Chinese side. So while Mattis lashed out at Chinese “coercion” in the South China Sea, Lieutenant General He Lei, vice-president of the Academy of Military Science, charged the US with militarising the region, adding that stationing of Chinese soldiers and weaponry was a symbol of sovereignty.

The question that remains is whether the US is willing to do more that Freedom of Navigation operations to counter China’s growing power in the disputed waters? Perhaps sanctions against Chinese companies involved in island building or expanding military to military cooperation?

Despite that and much to Beijing’s chagrin, the Indo-Pacific narrative appears to be gathering steam. French Defence Minister Florence Parly has indicated that Paris and London will be coordinating their vision on Asian affairs, sailing together across “certain seas.” Japan, Australia and the US also reportedly agreed to work together to deal with any attempt to change the status quo in the South China Sea unilaterally.

Chinese state media, however, has churned out a rather glowing appraisal of the Chinese delegation’s efforts in Singapore, stating that “China has played a crucial role by upholding its concept of a comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.” One of the highlights for state media was Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s comments about the need for “strong and stable” Sino-India ties. Chinese analysts have also welcomed Modi’s remarks. Unsurprisingly, there has been no mention of Modi’s language on the Indo-Pacific, rules-based order and ties with the US.

The Xinhua report after SLD also lashed out at “participants from some Western countries” who “tried to create tensions in the South China Sea, issuing false statements.” That’s becoming a bit of a theme in state media. Take this Global Times piece, which essentially cautions India from falling into a competition trap defined by the West.

A Case of the Pot and the Kettle

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In an article about Angela Merkel’s upcoming visit to China, The Global Times, published an article that called for more cooperation between the EU and China:

Although Europe is grappling with a multitude of problems like terrorism, the refugee crisis, Brexit and its declining clout, it still carries weight in the international community. To fulfill its responsibilities as a major country, China needs Europe’s cooperation on regional and global affairs such as climate change, counter-terrorism and global governance. This gets more important given the political upheaval triggered by Washington.

As China grows stronger economically and has a bigger say in the international community, more countries seek cooperation with China. In today’s world where countries are entwined in each other’s interests, more cooperation is a natural outcome and on an equal basis. In this process, mutual respect is essential while a condescending view must be abandoned.

While cooperation is worth lauding, the EU may be looking at China for investment and trade. However, it is also taking note of problems with Chinese sharp power as elsewhere in the world. The European Parliament released a two-page note on the debate on ‘China’s foreign influence operations in Western liberal democracies: An emerging debate’. Here, it takes stock of the events in Australia, New Zealand and the US. It also looks at the concerns about Chinese influencing politics within the EU:

As China successfully steers the debate on China in the EU to issues such as the country’s Silk Road initiatives, there is little room for discussion of the impact of alleged CCP-led foreign influence operations on EU norms and values. A case in point is the front-page articles by China’s Ambassador to the UK, published in a UK media outlet in January 2018 before Prime Minister Theresa May’s state visit to China and again in March 2018. Neither a German intelligence report uncovering Chinese operatives using fake LinkedIn profiles in more than 10 000 emails to German citizens allegedly to recruit informants, nor Chinese pressure on Western publishers to self-censor products for the Chinese market have triggered a debate.

While more countries in Europe may be keen to engage with China, they remain mindful of any attempts to influence the state of their democracies. So, China will have to consider this when they call for ‘mutual respect’ and abandoning a ‘condescending worldview’

 

How effective is China’s media management abroad?

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Over the past year, there has been increasing reportage on China’s efforts at influencing public discourse in other countries. The so-called sharp power debate has been most acute in countries like Australia, New Zealand, the US and parts of western Europe.

A key component of discourse management for Beijing is influencing media coverage in different countries in order to shape favourable attitudes towards China. Two recent reports offer fresh insight into this.

The first is a study led by the Prague-based Association for International Affairs, which outlines media coverage concerning China in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary from mid-2010 to 2017.

The study finds that the coverage in each country differs based on interests and domestic political and economic landscape. For instance, while media in the Czech Republic is “often openly critical” of China, this is not the case in Hungary and Slovakia.

Moreover, the sustainability of critical coverage is doubtful, given that cultivation of political elite, expanding economic linkages and Chinese investment in local media coincide with positive coverage. The study also finds that primarily it is economics that dominates the coverage of China, with issues of security, domestic politics in China, social issues and human rights taking a backseat.

Another interesting point to note is that generally the public in Hungary and Slovakia “is relegated to information mostly imported from foreign news agencies or English-speaking media sources.” This is deeply problematic in that it tends to lead to half-baked and potentially prejudiced coverage, which is unlikely to resonate with local concerns or facilitate informed debate.

The other study along similar lines assesses the media discourse around China in Canada over a 16-year period, starting from 2000. The authors find that over the years, print media coverage of China has turned slightly positive.

However, what’s fascinating about this paper is that it reveals the divergence between the Canadian public’s perception of China and media coverage. For instance, it cites polls, which indicate that the Canadian public remains deeply skeptical of the economic and political relationship with China.

Canadians apparently view the political rights situation in China as having deteriorated over the years and have grown more pessimistic about the benefits of deepening economic cooperation. And this, while the media coverage has focussed on economic relations with rights issues being marginalised.

Kowtowing to Chinese Maritime Power Is Not a Good Strategy

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I came across an essay titled China is Not Alone in Adding to the Indian Ocean Woes in the Economic & Political Weekly’s 28th April edition.

The article makes three points regarding maritime power in the Indian Ocean region. Each of the three points deserve closer scrutiny and hence this post.

The first point is that maritime power rests not just on managing the maximum number of ships and submarines but also on the control over maritime finance and particularly on maritime services. In the author’s words:

War vessels and merchantmen are the two most visible elements of power at sea. However, the marine service industry, the most important arm of maritime power generally remains obscured. The marine service sector regulates and organises the diverse maritime cluster. This silent force operates in the realm of marine manufacturing, marine legal services, engineering, and technology, and supports the charter, insurance, sale, and purchase of maritime assets. It also determines freight and cargo rates. It is this sector that helped Britain sustain its empire for another 75 years, after the US had become the centre of international manufacturing by the 1870s.

This is a point well made. Given that India’s current approach does not factor in the significance of maritime service industry, effectiveness of India’s exercise of maritime power will continue to be limited in the short-term.

The second point is that India should not solely be focused on China’s maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean:

We are afraid of the Chinese empire-in-the-making while being oblivious to the dangers that the existing American empire poses to the Indian Ocean region. We are so bothered about the Chinese developing a base in Djibouti, but have been oblivious of the fact that France and the US already have a base over there… We do not know how Chinese hegemony will work in the future, but we know the exploitative and heinous character of the French and the British Empires. The question is, why are we not as afraid of the West as we are of the Chinese?

From a realist perspective, this argument makes sense. Increase in power of the other states affects India’s ability to achieve its own objectives. The law of the jungle is indeed the nature of international relations but even so — and this is what the article misses — a bigger animal eats the smaller animal only when it is hungry. And as things stand, there’s only one state with the hunger for expansion in Indian Ocean. So, India must swing on this issue with the US and other powers to restrict the most imminent threat. This collaboration is also necessary to address the first point — building a maritime ecosystem (including a maritime services industry) of its own.

The third point the article makes is:

We cannot move ahead on the presumption that the Chinese empire will be bad. Who knows, it may be a little better and more peaceful than the wretched, iniquitous world that Anglo-American capital has created. The Indian navalists must be a little more judicious and not allow the Indian Navy to be used as a projectile to counter China.

Now this argument is far removed from reality. There is enough evidence to suggest that a Sinocentric world order will not align with India’s quest for yogakshema — peace and prosperity for all Indians. For a start, look at the way China has alienated — simultaneously and purposively — a new generation of peoples in all of its neighbouring countries. Then look at how the Chinese Communist Party has imposed one language on a diverse set of its own peoples. And finally, just glance at its social credit system to see the Chinese vision for the future.

Of course, the US conduct on the liberal international order that it carried forward from Europe has hardly been untainted. But the failings of the US cannot not be used to give a free pass to China.The reason is that irrespective of what the US does, India is fundamentally aligned with the norm of a liberal international order, for its own national interests. We must question the US when it deviates from this norm. But in a Sinocentric world, this norm itself will cease to exist.

This is what I wrote in Pragati a few days ago:

Legitimacy for the Chinese way of reordering the world is constrained by an essentially hierarchical Chinese worldview — one that divides the world between ‘civilisation’ and ‘non-civilisation’ depending on the extent of sinicisation a region has gone through. This makes the idea of a Pax Sinica a repulsive proposition to most states, let alone illegitimate. So, even if China were to become the most powerful state in the world, it is unlikely that it will become the most authoritative actor.

 

 

The Good Chinese Policeman

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Over the last few months, I’ve been catching up with Mandarin sitcoms, because they’re are interesting cases of soft power- and not in the least because I enjoy soppy sitcoms.

One show that really piqued my interest is called When a Snail Falls in Love (如果蜗牛有爱情). The show is about a team of officers in the Ling Police Department who deal with major crimes particularly drug and human trafficking. It moves into a how a huge family-owned corporation is used as a front for dealing drugs. As networks are often proved for illegal activities overlap, this drug route is also shown to have links with human traffickers across the borders of Thailand and Cambodia. The series ends with a bunch of cliff-hangers in Myanmar where a corrupt military officer with an appetite for violence is seen pitted against our protagonists from the Ling Police Department.

A number of scenes piqued my interest from a geopolitical perspective:

The entire season begins with Captain Ji Bai travelling undercover in a train in Myanmar. When a couple of thugs extort a man on the train, he jumps to the rescue, uses his superior physical prowesses to knock them out. When the police finally arrive on the scene, he flashes his Beijing City Police id card and is walks away scot-free.

In one of the final episodes our heroine, the criminal profiling intern Xu Xu witnesses a cruel officer shooting a Chinese offender in his charge. Xu Xu bursts into a tears and an impassioned speech about how the villain had chosen to abuse his power rather than trust in the rule of law which was always the case in China. This was moving untill I realised that it how the narrative ran contrary to reality. How much ever this show may be fiction, China remains a rule by law and not a rule of law.

The entire show is an interesting study of not only Chinese soft power, but the narratives that it posing. If you watch the show China appears as an Asian power, and its representatives are morally sound and work in a meritocratic system whose efficiency is laudable. Chinese police are easily able to cross borders and track down criminals even if they are embedded in another state’s mechanisms. The police officers travel to Myanmar through Chinese built trains and our leading pair often stares into the sunsets over shots of ports. I don’t doubt that the trains were necessary for the plot and I will assume that ports make for easily framed shots instead of jumping into conclusions about China’s projection of port infrastructure.

Overall, When a Snail Falls in Love is a good watch- it is informative about the way the Chinese perceive themselves and other nations. It is brilliantly shot and the fighting scenes are not over the top (as they usually are in a lot of Asian dramas). When a Snail Falls in love isn’t the fluffy romance that the title suggests (even if the actors are very easy on the eyes) and I would highly recommend you watch it. Here’s the trailer: