Copping out on Privatisation

The recent bank merger between Bank of Baroda, Vijaya Bank, and Dena Bank is essentially a move of cowardice, and not the bold reformist step it is touted to be. The original plan (for reforming the banking sector) was to have just 6 public sector banks, and while Modi has reduced the number from 26 to 19, there’s still a far way to go. Further, the plan was not to achieve the reduction in numbers by merging all of the public sector banks into 6 mega banks that are still in government control, but to privatise them eventually. However, the traditional governmental dislike for privatisation and the lack of political will in an election year resulted in this sub-optimal solution of merged banks.

The merged entity is set to become the third largest Indian bank, however the size is hardly important. In fact, it would actually deter any real progress in reforming the banking sector. Another move of cowardice was in giving the assurance that no jobs would be lost due to merger. Thus, the banks cannot really cut cost and achieve economies of scale in this aspect.

The history of such mergers is not reassuring. The merger of New Bank of India (NBI) with Punjab National Bank (PNB) in September 1993, of Global Trust Bank with Oriental Bank of Commerce in 2004, and the spate of merging the associate State Banks with the main State Bank have all worked poorly. The strong bank in the merger eventually ends up suffering considerable losses. The editorial in The New Indian Express comments:

“When a strong and weak bank merge, the combined entity loses competitiveness and the merger is counterproductive. An RBI working group recommended avoiding such events without first restructuring weaklings—a step now being bypassed.”

Failures are the essence of capitalism, so before gaining size, we need measures that allow banks to fail safely without causing systemic shocks like Lehman Brothers. No math can correct errors made out of lack of self-discipline, and as we still fight the last NPA war, rather than planning for the next one, it’s time to act bold, taking haircuts and ceding control to private parties. For, in a growing economy, banks should lend without worrying about provisions or sacrificing profits at the altar.

 

Which States are Financially Underdeveloped in India?

Which states are the least (most) financially developed in India? To answer this question, I construct a Financial Deprivation Index (FDI); the higher the FDI, the less financially developed a state is. FDI is based on three dimensions: branch coverage, deposit mobilisation and credit disbursal. The first dimension relates to the financial infrastructure, other two are the variables relevant for the long-term saving, consumption smoothing and investment.

To construct the FDI, deprivation scores are calculated by dividing the population of each state by the number of reporting branches, total deposits and credit outstanding as on 31st March, 2017, respectively. A simple average of these scores would be misleading as they carry different units. To get around this problem, the scores are centred about the mean and normalised by dividing by the range. Finally, a simple average of the normalised score is calculated which serves as the Financial Deprivation Index.

So much for the data and methodology. As for the results, they are depicted in the map shown above. The least financially developed states in India are Manipur, Bihar, Assam, Nagaland and Uttar Pradesh.

The most financially developed states/UTs in India are Chandigarh, Goa and NCT of Delhi. Given the level of urbanisation, this is hardly surprising. Among the larger units, Punjab, Kerala, Haryana, Karnataka and Maharashtra are the most developed states. Somewhat surprisingly, hilly states such as Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Himanchal Pradesh have fared well.

One surprising finding of the analysis was the extent of heterogeneity in the North-Eastern states. Assam, Manipur and Nagaland figure among  the least financially developed states in the country; Arunanchal Pradesh, Mizoram and Sikkim show decent performance in terms of FDI. Understanding the reasons of uneven development may provide valuable lessons for policy formulation.